In our reality and the hustle of daily life, there is one theme that remains invariably constant: corruption crimes. An alarming and destructive constant.

It would seem that some have been caught, convicted, and given real prison terms. Yet the dock does not remain empty – new defendants take their place. Often from the education sector, moreover, on serious charges – embezzlement of state funds.

BEHIND THE MASK OF HONESTY

...On July 21, 2026, the Criminal Chamber of the Karaganda Regional Court put an end to the case against Inna T., chief accountant of the State Communal Institution "Secondary School No. 33," and accountant Anna N. The verdict has entered into legal force. The appellate instance upheld the decision of the court of first instance without changes.

The criminal case of what seem to be modest accountants at an ordinary school strikes with two figures:

The amount embezzled – over three hundred million tenge!

And the duration of the crime – from January 2010 to June 2024!

Yes, for a full fourteen and a half years, two accountants at an ordinary school siphoned state funds into their personal bank accounts. This was not a single episode or a momentary temptation. They constructed a scheme that outlasted several school principals, who entrusted them with their electronic digital signatures – lending an air of legality to the illicit operations. Changes in school leadership had no effect on the persistence or constancy of the embezzlement.

This was a game played on trust, hidden behind a mask of honesty and responsibility.

The criminal saga for the school's chief accountant, Inna T., began in January 2010. Realizing that the director of School No. 33, A., was far removed from the sphere of accounting, she surmised that this could be exploited. Thus, a criminal plan was born in her mind. Exploiting that trust, the chief accountant obtained the director's electronic digital signature to freely transfer budget funds. However, she began crediting them to her own bank account.

After the change of school leadership in January 2011, when S. took over, Inna T. continued to divert a portion of the school's budget funds for her own benefit. From January to December 2010, she had unjustifiably transferred 4,223,674 tenge to herself; from January to December 2011, the amount rose to 5,829,476 tenge.

A forensic financial examination conducted during the investigation would reveal that state funds flowed regularly into Inna T.'s bank accounts. The verdict lists their cumulative annual totals: in 2012 – 5,353,473 tenge; 2013 – 6,896,609 tenge; 2014 – 10,002,166 tenge; 2015 – 9,802,570 tenge; 2016 – 11,743,366 tenge; 2017 – 11,694,814 tenge; 2018 – 6,776,322 tenge; 2019 – 18,506,934 tenge; 2020 – 15,717,861 tenge; 2021 – 19,066,906 tenge; 2022 – 23,228,860 tenge; 2023 – 24,808,983 tenge; and in 2024 – 18,318,638 tenge.

THE ACCOMPLICE

Anna N. entered this criminal saga on November 22, 2010, when the director of School No. 33, A., appointed her to the position of accountant with an official salary of 29,900 tenge.

A few months later, while working with staff schedules, timesheets, payroll records, the "1C-Accounting" software, and other financial documentation, Anna N. picked up a trail, sensing that something was amiss.

Having confirmed the facts of embezzlement by chief accountant Inna T., she – as stated in the verdict – "conceived a criminal intent to jointly commit the embezzlement of budget funds through deception and abuse of trust, as part of a group by prior conspiracy, using official position, on an especially large scale."

To realize her criminal intent, Anna N. informed Inna T. of what she had uncovered and expressed her desire to join the criminal activity of seizing budget funds.

Inna T., seeking to avoid exposure and recognizing that Anna N. possessed professional accounting expertise as well as actual access to the "1C-Accounting" system and financial records, concluded that it would be expedient to involve Anna N. in the existing criminal scheme. In this regard, Inna T. agreed to act jointly, thereby entering into a criminal conspiracy.

Thus, a criminal tandem was formed – they immediately set to work together. Now they pilfered the budget as a duo.

According to the forensic economic examination, Anna N. embezzled a total of 113,087,767 tenge over the years by unjustifiably transferring funds to her personal bank accounts under the guise of allowances, benefits, and other payments.

During this entire period, the school saw five different principals. Money leaked from the school budget, but none of the directors noticed it, fully entrusting the financial side to these two scheming women from accounting – who, I remind you, embezzled over 316 million tenge in total.

HOW WAS THIS EVEN POSSIBLE?

Behind that sum lie years of underfunded expenditure items. Funds intended for the school's needs – allocated as allowances, benefits, and other payments to teachers – instead ended up in their personal accounts. Money that could have gone toward classroom repairs, teaching materials, or decent working conditions for teachers was diverted for private gain.

THE VERDICT

The final chapter in the long-running impunity of the convicted came with the first-instance court verdict: six years of imprisonment for Inna T. and seven years for Anna N., along with disqualification from holding accounting positions in state organisations and the quasi-state sector for a period of five years. As already noted, the appellate court upheld the verdict. The appeals lodged by the convicted and their defense counsel did not change the outcome. The chamber affirmed the sentence, confirming both the proportionality of the punishment and the amount of damages established.

The state intends to recover the stolen funds, not merely to impose criminal punishment. The court granted the civil claim for damages, setting a six-month period for voluntary restitution and maintaining the seizure of Inna T.'s real estate assets.

TRUST, BUT VERIFY

The mechanism of embezzlement established by the court – abuse of official position and breach of trust committed by a group acting by prior conspiracy – is fairly typical for such cases.

But this time, the investigating authorities and the court were confronted with the sheer scale of the theft and the duration of the crime.

It exposed a glaring fact: the absence of any system of internal and external control. How else to explain that for a decade and a half, an institution failed to notice – or did not wish to notice – what was happening? Where were the routine checks, audits upon change of directors, or inspections? What about the regular reporting periods – quarterly, annual? Over three hundred million tenge – a "needle in a haystack"?

None of the prescribed control functions worked. No one stopped the well-oiled criminal scheme until its discovery in 2024. Nor did the age-old wisdom come into play – trust, but verify…

One must therefore conclude that there was complete irresponsibility and criminal negligence on the part of the school principals. One of them, questioned in court, stated that chief accountant Inna T. had shown herself "only in a positive light" and that, as school director, she did not sign financial and accounting documents – those actions were carried out by the chief accountant, who fully managed the accounting department and enjoyed complete trust. She added that the chief accountant Inna T. and accountant Anna N. maintained good, friendly relations.

Well, we have no doubt that it was precisely their team cohesion that helped them so harmoniously "navigate" the expanse of the school budget.

WILL THE LESSON BE TAKEN TO HEART?

A new school year lies ahead. And this case cannot be treated by the country's educational authorities and the region simply as just another criminal report. It must become a glaring call to address the vulnerabilities of a system in which access to budget funds and signing authority are concentrated in the hands of a narrow circle of people without proper independent oversight.

And also the fact that the use of other people's electronic signatures – instead of serving as a technology designed to simplify and secure document flow – has become a real instrument for concealing long-term embezzlement.

There are also questions for higher-level bodies. As long as state and quasi-state organisations lack a system of regular independent audits, rotation of responsible persons, and tamper-proof electronic document management, the risk of such stories recurring will persist – with different names, in different schools and organisations.

We have grown accustomed to stories of budget fund embezzlement in the education system typically featuring executives, officials, and the like – but not rank-and-file accounting staff. Now the paradigm is shifting. It is precisely these individuals who are increasingly ending up in the dock in cases of financial abuse in the education sector – from district education departments down to individual institutions. The "Yuridicheskaya Gazeta" has repeatedly reported on such facts.

These trends reveal a stable and troubling pattern. The mechanism of such crimes is almost always the same. An accountant, having access to the institution's settlement accounts and the authority to prepare payment documents, uses their official position for personal enrichment. For example, by artificially inflating salary coefficients, accruing payments to non-existent or actually non-working employees, or entering false information into accounting and personnel records.

Outwardly, everything looks legal and perfectly respectable: there are signatures, stamps, and postings.

Exposure usually comes only after inspections by the anti-corruption service or the prosecutor's office. It then emerges that what was stolen was not abstract "state money," but funds intended for children's meals, repairs, teachers' salaries, and educational materials. And every stolen tenge is a resource that the school – which often already suffers from funding shortfalls – did not receive.

It is time to recognise a systemic vulnerability: inadequate internal control, weak or absent auditing, and excessive trust. Therefore, each such case is not merely a crime or court report, but a signal of the need to strengthen financial control in educational institutions: mandatory regular independent audits, separation of powers, digitalisation of accounting as a safeguard against forgery. The human factor must be eliminated at all stages, so that temptation does not arise.

Until these measures become the norm, such stories will repeat themselves. In different cities, with different names, but following the same script.

Akmara ABDULLOVA